THE GERMAN MENACE.

Gisborne Times, Volume XXVII, Issue 2508, 22 May 1909, Page 2

THE GERMAN MENACE.

how does England stand ?

(By "The Times” Military Correspondent.)

To what extent, if at all, should the recent revelations in Parliament affect the organic basis upon which the. land forces*of the Crown at present rest ? In every single examination of our military problems, whether at home or abroad, the supremacy of our Navy lias hitherto been assumed. Such supremacy is necessarily the primary condition for the security of an oceanic Empire united by the highway of the sea, and, without this supremacy, the integrity of the King’s dominions, except by the condescension of a stronger rival, cannot be assured. Grave doubts have now* for the first time in our modern history, been c-x-. pressed' whether we shall be able to preserve this supremacy against a formidable Power which, thanks to resolute and uninterrupted efforts, has provided itself with facilities not incomparable with ours for the construction, armament, manning, and repair of ships of Avar. This Power has sought to lull us into a false sense of security while proceeding with its designs; first, by’a soofhing letter despatched to a British Eirst Lord at the moment when its preparations were being secretly developed to a high degree of intensity, and, secondly, by protestations of friendliness, and by declarations of good intentions not amounting to a-pledge, representing the normal diplomatic procedure of every aggressh'e Power before its preparations are complete. The extent of our danger must first he measured dispassionately and without exaggeration. It is admitted that our supremacy at sea is at present reasonably assured, errors and omissions of British strategy excluded. This satisfactory state of affairs will last until such time as our pre-Dreadnought fleet is, in Mr Asquith’s words, gradually excluded from effective competition, and this time is fixed by the Prime Minister, on the advice of all the foremost naval experts, at from fivo to eight years. During the years 1914-IG, therefore, our pre-Dreadnouglit battleships and armoured cruisers Avill become relatively ineffective and Avill thenceforAvard cease to count in our comparisons cf naval strength. How shall we stand in 1914? The materials for forming a judgment only allow us to calculate, and even then without absolute precision, up to March 1912. By that date the Germans may have 17 'Dreadnoughts afloat, and Ave shall liaA r o 16 or 20, according as Ave lay doAvn four or eight ships this year. Such is the official computation, and it is, in all conscience, had enough as it stands. We have; as yet, no definite assurance that the Government aa ill la doAvn more than four ships this year. They will decide according to their information of the progress of German shipbuilding, information which events . have shown to be untrustwotthy, tai-dy, and incomplete. It may ho so again, and we cannot count upon more than four ships till more are laid down. Consequently we may not be up to the one’PoAver standard in Dreadnoughts by March, 1912, and if more pessimistic calculations turn out to be correct, \ve shall,be much below the one-1 ower standard in this dominant type of ship. In Avliat manner can we hope to reestablish our supremacy between 1912 and 1914, when the pro-Dreadnought types will gradually he excluded from effective competition ? We shall, no doubt, sooner or later, do all we can, hut it remains to be seen Avliether Germany will not do as much or more. H she pleases she may do as much, and we cannot stop her. It is admitted that her resources for warship construction and armament almost equal ours, "_hde manning presents no insuperable .diiticulty to a nation Avliich accepts the principle of personal service. That Germany’s preparations avill stop at tlio point which they have now reached against all precedents > and probabilities. It has always been assumed in Germany that a fresh naval law wi.i Le passed in 1911, and there appears, at present to be no assurance Avhatsoever that Germany will not preserve the advantage which, by her intelligence, foresight, and sacrifices, she has gallantly Avon and richly dcserA*ed. lo such straits have we been brought by the odious intrigues and criminal folly of a few members of the Cabinet and their supporters in the House of Commons whose sinister designs have been insufficiently resisted by the Board of Admiralty. , . ~ . Moreover, the fuil extent of the danger is not measured by the mere numerical statement of Dreadnoughts built and building in England and Germany. Germany has allies, and we, tor the purposes of war in European Avaters, have none. The interposition of Germany’s alios in a navai war must he assumed. These allies are Mediterranean Powers, and one of them—namely Austria —intends to add Dreadnoughts to her navy. Either our Mediterranean Squadron ihust have similar ships to oppose them, or avc may be compelled in time of war to abandon the Mediterranean as in 1796. Broadly speaking, then, the position is that we have relative though steadily diminishing security at sea for live years to come, and that, aftei that lapse of time, all is doubt and uncertainty. This is the best we can say, for the position cannot be better and may be persistent and continuous effort we could, with certainty, outbuild Germany, our first duty would be. to set to Avork and outbuild her. But if, hav- , ing organised her slips, yards, docks, and foundries in advance, Germany is now able to build ship for ship against us, then in the end the relative position of the two navies may, from 1912 onwards, remain unchanged. There is a chance that the strengths of the British and German navies, in the years Avliich lie before us, may not be very unequal, and this is a new probability, and perhaps a new fact, which we have to take into account. . /If avo possessed a million men in the Territorial Force sufficiently trained to take effective share in field operations at the outbreak of war, then this non fact, hoAvever deplorable, would not necessarily be fatal. Wo could make a certainty of driving into the sea the first cchleon of invaders before the .second could arrive. Consequently no arm y of invasion Avotild be despatches. Wo have no such force, and, unless we have it, the existence of England may remain, five years hence, at the hazard of an equal naval chance. It is true that there still remain, a, few people, drowning doctrinaires who .clutch at the straws <n an exploded heresy, who declare that if we tem,polar i’v lose the command of the sea in home waters we are ruined, because the enemy will starve us and need not land a man. upon our shores to secure this ie, salt, -This is the argument of those, to whom personal service, despite its manifest advantages to .'the physique and discipline of the people,, is more abhorrent than a foreign foe m our midst. The argument is,fal’acions, because not

all the navies of all the PoAvers of Europe combined could blockade the Uxn'ted Kingdom after heating our Navy. The Prince of Wales’ Commission on Food Supplies in Time o’f War showed 'that 12 per cent, of the shipping operating on our main routes of trade suffices “to meet all our annual requirements of Avheat and flour; Gibraltar, closely blockaded, by the fleets of France and Spain, Avas constantly. supplied by ships arriving Avithout escort throughout the siege, and it is absurd to suppose that the hundreds of ports and havens on our Avestern coasts could' be blockaded effectively by all the navies "bf Europe in combination. Great losses Ave should inevitably suffer by temporary defeat at sea, betAveen loks and ruin, shortage of supplies and starvation, there is a wide gulf- To .rum England an enemy must land m England and subdue’ her. So long as no enemy can occupy England with lus land forces every defeat can be. letiiev-, od and naval resurrection is ahvays possible. In the contrary event the surrender of the remains of our Navy ail’d the demolition of our naval yards will be demanded in the .term* or pc.u.-e by a foe with his iron heel upon our necks and no resurrection of naval poAver avill be possible afterwards. So long as avo -pander to all the powers of selfishness and refuse to become a nation in arms we deliberately provoke the misfortune Avliich Ave fear and encourage - Germany to -persevere in her naval armaments with the object of opposing her -strength on land to our shameful weakThe provision of a million sufficiently trained men in the Territorial Force -will not cost a fraction of the vast and constantlv increasing sums which we shall, from now onward, devote to our NaA*y. But whereas our future naval expenditure, the dance of millions notwithstanding, may conceivably leave us, ..as against Germany, in no better relative posture than before, the creation oi a nation in Arms, will prevent panic, maintain credit, and prevent a sing o defeat at sea from terminating our ex’istenee as an independent State. Military force is not a substitute tor naval force, but the complement of it. Every strategical problem is a conjoint pioulem of uaA*al and military force, and it is in this manner that it. must alwavs be considered. 1 On the Prime Minister’s showing, we have five year’s grace in which to introduce national training, and to create a nation in arms. The founda-ion exists in the Territorial Force which we •OAve to the foresight and capacity of Mr Haldane. It is unon tins foundation that we must build, and it may be remarked that the organisation has been established on the basis ot popu.ation and is therefore eminently fitted for our purpose. EA r ei*A* statesman who, from tins tinm 'forward, neglects to advocate national training as a public duty will deserve, and will assuredly recei\*o, the nniearations of posterity; and every citizen who combats or.delays the introduction of this indisnensable reform deserves to he execrated as a public enemy and will richly merit the Avorst fate that can befall him. ■