UNCLE SAM AND THE WAR DEBTS

Manawatu Standard, Volume LIII, Issue 22, 22 December 1932, Page 2

UNCLE SAM AND THE WAR DEBTS

The Groat War began in August, 1914; America’s declaration did not come till April, 1917. During this period of nearly three years America maintained its traditional policy of non-intervention in the affairs of Europe. From the outset many of its bestknown citizens had disapproved of this aloofness. Theodore Roosevelt, a former President; had cried in plain anguish against his country’s failure to protest against tho German violation of Belgium. But (says the Sydney Bulletin), though there were many men of the Roosevelt stamp, it is unhappily not a fact that tho nation divided itself into two camps, one for war and tho other against it. For over two years there was indeed no war party worth mentioning. There were two parties, it is true. A considerable section, led by Woodrow Wilson, honestly hated war and believed that it was no part of America’s duty to enter into European conflicts'. We mostly read history as we want to read it, and for a hundred years and more America had been opening its arms wide to all Europe. “We are,” said President Wilson as late as March, 1917, “a composite and cosmopolitan peoplo. We are of tho blood of all tho nations that are at war.” And there was a far greater section winch saw in the war merely an opportunity to make money out of other people’s folly and wickedness.

There can be no doubt that in the end Germany felt that America would not lose its most wonderful moneymaking opportunity no matter what happened. But Germany miscalculated. America might not ho willing to come into the quarrel because of anything, no matter how outrageous, that might be done in Europe : but it was not willing to permit its good trade to be interfered with. Mr Lansing in April, 1916, had called on the German Government to abandon its “submarine warfare against pssenger and freight-carrying vessels.” Tho German Government had appeared to consent to this. But it was only making its preparations; and at tho end of January, 1917, it notified that on tho following day it would recommence unrestricted submarine warfare. On April 2 President Wilson advised Congress that “the recent course of the Imperial Government” was “in fact nothing less than war ngainst the Government and the people of the United States.” “We have no selfish ends to serve,” ho declared in another address. “Wo desire no conquest, no dominion. Wo seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind.” Such, then was the position in America up to the final break, and such was the cause of the break. In the very nature of tho case there could have been no preparation for war in such an America. It was “of the blood of all the nations that were at war,” sorry for their quarrels, maybe, but very glad to do any business that might spring out of those quarrels and not concerned to share otherwise in them. “Too proud to fight”—and that was without doubt the sincere statement of the President’s attitude —it was both too proud and too discreet to make any preparation to fight. Up to this time, it is important to remember, the United States Government had not lent Britain or the Allies one penny. As a neutral it could not do so. Its people, certainly, had lent money, in the way of private investments ; and they had bought back from Britain great quantities of American securities. But every penny of the money which Britain and the Allies owo the United States, and which has been the subject of Conferences and Notes, was advanced by the United States after the latter, had agreed to come into the war, asking “no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make,” but as “one of the champions of the rights of mankind.” The money, moreover, was expressly made avaibale to the Governments engaged in war with the enemies of the United States,” and the credits were authorised “for the purpose of more effectually providing for the national security and defence, and for prosecuting the war.” And there was more behind that provision “for the national security and defence” than appears on the surface; a note dated January 19 from Berlin to Mexico had been intercepted proposing in the event of war “an offensive and defensive alilance between Germany, Mexico and Japan,” Mexico being lured with tho prospect of recovering lost territory. So America w r as in the war; it ivas now an enemy that Germany was entitled to damage where it could arid how it could. That Germany did not send an army against an utterly and deliberately unprepared America was due to tho fact that the Allies stood in the way. During this period America did not, could not, put one soldier into the fighting lines in France. Looking back after six years the Com-mander-in-Chief of the American armies in France said:—

What was the situation in 1917? Wo had no plans, no preparation, no artillery, no transportation, no ships—in fact, nothing. If it had not been that the Allies were able to hold the lines for 15 months after we had entered the war, hold them with the support of loans we made, the war might well have been lost. And he proceeded:— It seems to me ... we should bear a certain part of the expense in'maintaining the Allied armies on the front while we were preparing, instead of calling all this money a lonn and insisting on its payment. We were responsible. We gave the money knowing it would be used to hold the Boclie until we could prepare. Fifteen months! Think of it! What happened in those 15 months? On the one side, fighting now the fight of America, in the great struggle, but unable as yet to do more than provide the funds, the Allies themselves having been bled dry—on the one side, we say, the Allies wero sacrificing their manhood and suffering all the personal agonies which only a nation in the fighting line can suffer. The Allies lost 3,500,000 lives, and that awful 15 months of smashing blows was responsible for certainly 700,000 of them. On the other side, America was ticking up a bill not merely of money advanced but of interest on money advanced. As thenshare in the joint adventure the Allies were reaping death America was reaping dollars. Let us admit freely that America won the war. But it was not with the armies it landed in France. How little they really counted may be judged by the" fact that, whereas France alone lost 1,445,000 killed and 4,000,000 wounded, America’s total loss was 50,000 'killed, 210.000 wounded. America won the war with the money which it was able to supply the Allies “for the purpose of more effectually providing for the national security and defence, and for prosecuting the war.” Now it wants the money back, and interest with the principal. But it is true that Britain and its Allies signed the bond. We had reached a stage when nothing mattered but to win—we were prepared to sign almost anything, to promise almost anything. Britain has never made even the shadowiest suggestion that it might repudiate its share of the debt on that account —this debt of 9J billion dollars for principal and 11 billion dollars for in-

terest. But to tho credit of a body of men in the United States nn unceasing agitation has proceeded there on behalf of tho national reputation for fair dealing. If tho agitation does not succeed, but if America insists upon its full pound of flesh, asking if it is not so nominated in the bond, the world will be bound very regretfully to remember Uncle Sam ns being too proud to fight but not too proud to charge interest on the money ho supplied to others that they might do his fighting.