THE WESTERN FRONT

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 80, 5 January 1945, Page 2

THE WESTERN FRONT

RUNDSTEDT’S BREAK. THROUGH QUESTIONS BEING ASKED VIEWS OF COMMENTATORS (Rec. 12.30 p.m.) London, Jan. 4. Why did von Rundstedt break through? Why did he fail in his attack? Are there going to be changes at SHAEF° Were the Allies over-con-fident? Why should winter delay our forces but von Rundstedt win a battle? Those are some of the questions now being asked about the Western Front. Several attempts are being made to answer them. It has long been admitted that the Allies were completely surprised by von Rundstedt’s attack in the locality used by the Germans not only in 1940 but also in 1914. The “Daily Express’s” commentator, Alan Moorehead,, discussing the queries, says after the Normandy break-out General Eisenhower made two prodigious decisions first, to take the field command himself, and secondly, bring all his armies up to* the Rhine together. While the German line solidified the Allied armicj toiled painfully up to the Rhine and Supreme Headquarters found itself conducting a battle from 150 miles away. From the Mediterranean to the English Channel six armies were deployed and there was no real cutting edge anywhere. Soon th« individual commanders found even if they did makj a breach in the German line they had no reinforcements on hand to back it up and go through. Faced with this evenly spread pressure the German line was able to hold intact, which was the state of affairs by the end of November. It then became difficult for the Allies to get news out of Germany and follow the real movements of the Wehrmacht, while von Rundstedt with the Germans and German sympathisers behind the Allied lines found it easy to get information. He marshalled the Sixth Panzer Army north of the Ardennes, and discovered that green American troops had n ov.d in the line in the First American Army. In the --cond week of De. cember when there was no moon he took the Fifth Panzer Army from the line opposite the Liege and slipped it quietly down and opposite to Luxemburg while the Sixth Panzer moved into positions vacated by the Fifth. When the weather was suitable he struck a weak spot in the American line and, largely due to our policy of keeping divisions well forward, he burst through into the comparatively vacant rear areas. Moorehead praises the reaction of the Americans and goes on to comment: “For many months now we have abandoned the use of surprise in our planning. We simply packed troops up to the line and slogged ahead in fairly obvious directions.” THE SUPREME COMMAND Other correspondents also comment on the fact of the Supreme Command being too far back and on the dispersal of Allied strength. It is pointed out that if the earlier system of a fighting command being in the hands of a specialist like Field-Marshal Montgomery, as in Normandy, had been maintained the setback might have been averted. At the same time it is generally remarked that there is every confidence in General Eisenhower. Discussion on 'these lines seems fairly general, but messages from New York declare that the chance of Field Marshal Montgomery being promoted commander of the Allied land forces under General Eisenhower are “remote.” Regarding other questions “Strategicus” in the “Spectator” remarks: “What was at -fault was the absurd self-confi-dence which has characterised the Allied outlook ever since the exploitation of the battle of Normandy” and the tendency to be convinced by one’s own propaganda. He asks what save thi§ self-confidence can explain the ease with which the Germans concentrated in secret and then overran some 70 miles of Allied front. Correspondents on the Western Front and in Switzerland are expressing the opinion that the Germans “fooled” the Allies about their petrol shortage and by using horsedrawn traffic deliberately built up a reserve for the offensive which aimed at capturing enough Allied petrol and oil to sustain the drive through to Antwerp. It is declared that petrol was in fact one of the chief objectives of the offensive but there is no doubt after three months’ hoarding the Germans had enough for the present battle plan. Berne reports state that observers in Berlin are convinced that the Germans had far greater stores of petrol than the Allies believed, while synthetic oil is still being manufactured. At the same time the Wehrmacht is “thirsty” for petrol. - N It is likely questions on von Rundstedt's offensive will be asked and answered when the House of Commons reassembles on January 16. —P.A. Special Correspondent.