148

A. 5

Fifth Day. 23 April 1907.

that question with me as to how the wants of each particular Colony may be met in the sort of way that 1 have roughly suggested. There are just two or three points that I think I ought to allude to. The first is the question of manning, which is a very important one. The present view of the Admiralty undoubtedly is, after very careful consideration of the whole subject, that the conditions of modern war probably would lead rather to the loss of ships than of men; that the results of the Japanese War and other experience have shown that the loss is rather one of ships than of the men who are on board those ships; that there is always a considerable number of men saved even if a ship is lost, and that the loss of men in a naval battle is small in proportion to the loss of men on land. That must always be remembered. So that w-hat we may naturally expect is that as a war goes on and we are subject to the casualties of war we shall find that we have a number of men at our disposal, whose ships perhaps have either been damaged or lost, to use on board other ships. Another point that I should like to remind you of is the long time under modern conditions that* it takes to train a man properly to do his work efficiently on one of these great modern battleships. I think I am not exaggerating in the least when I say that for the higher ratings on board ship certainly six years are taken to train a man to do his work properly. The higher ratings now in the Navy are really trained and skilful mechanics, and they only are able to take the duties of those ratings and to undertake the machinery, gunnery, torpedo, and other work of that sort. Untrained men are useless for that work, and therefore we are bound to have men who have gone through a long and careful training. Then it is the same thing, to a still greater extent perhaps, as regards the officers. Ido not consider that an officer really can start on his career now on less than eight years' training. Of course, we take them very young —at 13 now—and by the time they are 21 or 22 they become lieutenants, but even then I do not for a moment suggest that they are fully capable of dischargirrg all the important work that has to be done by officers. This, however, I can say with the greatest confidence, that you may have the most magnificent ships, guns, armour, and everything else, but if the human element is not very properly trained, your guns, your armour, and your ships are absolutely useless. The w r hole history of our Navy shows that the selfsacrifice and endurance of British sailors has been beyond compare, and I believe at this moment they have reached a higher state of efficiency than has ever been known before in the history of our country. I make that remark, because I think it is only fair to warn the Conference that the admission of an unlimited number of men to the Naval Service is in practice impossible. I mean we should have nothing for them to do. We should not be able to employ them. Then there is a point which has been alluded to more than once by speakers, and that is the question of the distribution of ships. At this moment no doubt we are under certain obligations with regard to Australia as to the ships that are to be on that particular station. If, in future, as I hope will be the case, there will be greater concentration of the ships, I want it to be very distinctly understood that I do not believe that our dominions beyond the seas would suffer in any way from such an arrangement. They would not even suffer in the show made by British ships in Colonial waters, because though it may be perfectly true that vessels may not be so frequently on the station, yet, as I believe, future developments will lead to the Colonies not having the secondary or not quite the best of the ships, but they would see the big battleships and cruisers from time to time. This would really give a much greater show and give the Colonies a much better idea of what the British Navy is than the ships that they have now stationed permanently

Naval D«f«ho«. (Lord Tweedmouth.)